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ABSTRACT
The growing presence of the far right in both internet and physical spaces
is of concern because of the associated violence and civil unrest. The presence
of the far right on the internet is historical and persistent. It is used by the far right
movement to engage, radicalize, fellowship, plan and execute events, some of
which are violent. This thesis explores the ways in which the far right uses online
spaces and offline spaces in tandem, and how the use of imagery facilitates this
process. To do this a visual and audio analysis was conducted on 100 videos
posted to the social media site Parler on January 6, 2021. The videos were
analyzed for far right related imagery and songs, chants, and narration to help
shed light on how cyberspace and real life space not only worked in tandem, but
in this event, became one and the same. The analysis found that while certain
high profile far right groups kept their imagery visibility low, America First had a
visible presence and they engaged in rhetoric decrying globalization and
immigrants, which is of concern as it is the unifying theme nurturing growing
global ties among the far right. The results also demonstrated the tension
between pro law enforcement and antigovernment far right groups as well as the
far rights weaponization of patriotic symbols.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to recognize and thank my family and friends for their support
and encouragement. I never thought, almost 15 years after completing my
undergraduate work and teaching credential program, that when I returned to
university it would turn out to be in the middle of an historic pandemic.
Thank you to my friends and professors, especially Dr. Grisham, Dr.
Pytell, and Dr. Khan, in the Social Science and Globalization program. I learned
so much and I value the time I spent with you. To the ladies of the “Thesis
Support” group text, Melissa, Mayra, and Rubi, thank you for the laughs, the
help, and the encouragement.
To my mother, April Bachelder, and my sisters Cody and Ashley
Bachelder, thank you for always believing in me and encouraging my academic
studies.
To my children, Xavier, Alex, and Amaia LaMar, I missed you so much as
the pandemic made visits nearly impossible. The family texts and Facetime visits
helped so much, and you never doubted my success. I love you all so much.
To my rock, my life partner, my husband, my love, Rodney LaMar. Your
unwavering support, love, encouragement, and ability to make me laugh when I
most needed it, made this process possible. Thank you, I love you, and I so look
forward to our next 30 years together.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....................................................................................iv
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................ vii
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................. viii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Introduction………………………………………………………………………1
Research Problem and Hypothesis….………………………………………..2
Type of Research……………………………………………………………….3
Defining the Far Right ................................................................................ 4
What Makes the Far Right Extremist? ....................................................... 7
Historical Overview of the Online Presence of the Far Right ................... 11
Imagery Types………….……………………………………………………...14
Summary………………………………………………………………………..14
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction……………………………………………………………………..15
Theoretical Frameworks Useful in Understanding the Far Right:
Landscapes, the Imaginary, and Ecosystems .......................................... 15
Cyberspace and Growing Transnational Ties Among the Far Right….….22
The Role of Imagery……………………………………………………..……24
Summary………………………………………………………………………..27
CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
Introduction .............................................................................................. 29
Research Design………………………………………………………………30

v

Sampling and Procedures…………………………………………………….31
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Introduction. ............................................................................................. 34
Analysis Findings………………………………………………………………35
Visual Analysis Findings .............................................................. 35
Audio Analysis Findings………………………………………………39
Discussion of Findings……………………………...…………………………47
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Research Question……………………………………………………………50
Cyberspace, Physical Space, and Imagery………………………………...50
Study Limitations………………………………………………………………51
Recommendations…………………………………………………………….51
APPENDIX A: GOOGLE FORM ......................................................................... 53
APPENDIX B: SPREADSHEET OF RESPONSES ………………………………60
REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 62

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Types of Imagery Shown on Hats and Beanies …………...…..………..37
Table 2. Types of Imagery Shown on Flags ....................................................... 38
Table 3. Chants and Songs ............................................................................... 40
Table 4. Narration by Speakers On and Off Camera .......................................... 46

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Far-Right Online Ecosystem................................................................ 22
Figure 2. Video Recordings by Location………….……………….….…………….35

viii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Introduction
January 6, 2021, was a cold day in Washington, D.C. The weather
hovered in the low 40s Fahrenheit, but the temperature of the crowd at the “Save
America” rally was heating up. President Trump implored the crowd, “if you don’t
fight like hell, we won’t get our country back” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 24).
Before the former President was done speaking, parts of the crowd had made
their way down Pennsylvania Avenue and were already pushing at the gates of
the US Capitol building. Some of these individuals were members of far right
organizations that had planned and were now carrying out an attack on the
Capitol. Inside the building, the members of the United States Congress, along
with Vice President Mike Pence, were in the process of certifying the election
results. The process continued until the crowd breached the building.
This event lasted just over four hours, but its historical significance cannot
be measured, at least not yet. It has been called a breach, a riot, a siege, an
insurrection, and a coup d’état. Regardless of label, it was both planned and
executed using the internet. It was also live streamed and uploaded to the
internet in real time. Video after video of the day shows people with phones out.
It is known that far right actors and groups took part in the events at the Capitol
on January 6, 2021. The far right has used the internet since the early 1980s.
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The progression of the far right’s persistent presence and its ability to harness
the internet to further its agenda represents a danger to civil society.
This paper begins by defining the far right and outlining how and why the
far right is considered extremist. It then investigates the history and current state
of the far right’s presence on the internet, followed by theoretical frameworks
from the field of social science to help in understanding the far right. A visual and
audio analysis of the events of January 6, 2021, at the United States Capitol is
undertaken and results show that cyber and physical spaces merged into one
space on that day and imagery was prevalent in those spaces, serving as a
source of solidarity and purpose for the participants.
The following sections of chapter one cover the research problem and
hypothesis, the type of research, and definitions. The definitions section covers
the far right, extremism, internet presence, and imagery. These sections contain
historical information where appropriate to both provide context and reflect the
Master’s program of study.

Research Problem and Hypothesis
This thesis explores how the far right uses cyber and real life spaces in
tandem and how imagery facilitates this process. This question arose after
witnessing various flags being flown, taken down and then re-flown around the
rural areas of the High Desert of Southern California during the run up to the
November 2020 election. The High Desert is known to be conservative leaning
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with a lot of support for former President Trump and it is also known to have
individuals who are part of the far right movement. The observations of the flags
spurred further questions: why were the flags going up and down, was there
some type of message being sent, and where would discussion of this occur?
This led to research on the far right, especially concerning their use of internet
spaces in conjunction with real life events, and how imagery facilitates this
process. This research led to a hypothesis that the internet was integral to the
events of January 6, 2021, at the U.S. Capitol and that imagery was a major
factor in creating solidarity and purpose among the participants.

Type of Research
Research was conducted to explore this question, including the reading of
several books, scholarly articles, and journalism articles. First it was important to
understand the history of the far right, especially their online presence. Research
into far right imagery and the mediums on which they predominantly appear was
also conducted. To reflect the Master’s program of study completed concurrently
to writing this thesis, an interdisciplinary approach from the lens of social science,
using theories of anthropology, geography, sociology, and political science, was
taken, while historical background was provided where appropriate. In addition,
the growing global nature of the far right was also explored to reflect the Master’s
course of study.
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Defining the Far Right
Professor and director of the Polarization and Extremism Research and
Innovation Lab (PERIL) at American University, Cynthia Miller-Idriss (2020) offers
a comprehensive definition of the far right. Miller-Idriss’s (2020) research of the
far right includes field work done in both the United States and Germany. She
places the far right into “four separate but overlapping categories:
antigovernment and antidemocratic practices and ideals, exclusionary beliefs,
existential threats and conspiracies, and apocalyptic fantasies’’ (Miller-Idriss,
2020, p. 4). The practices and ideals of the antigovernment and antidemocratic
portion of the far right seek to undermine democratic ideals around the globe.
Miller-Idriss (2020) cites “disinformation campaigns, election interference, attacks
on the freedom of the press, violating the constitutional protection of minority
rights, or using violence and terrorism to achieve political goals” as actions taken
by these groups, who often form into paramilitary groups and militias in the
United States and in Europe form third parties who put forth candidates for office,
sometimes being successful. Miller-Idriss (2020) notes that in the United States
the lack of influential third parties resulted in far right candidates running as
Republicans and attempting to sway the party from within (p. 5). This can be
seen in their adoption of some of the far right’s talking points and specifically their
use of exclusionary and dehumanizing language.
This language reflects the far right category of exclusionary beliefs. The
belief system of the far right is hierarchical and includes “racist, anti-immigrant,
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nativist, nationalist, white-supremacist, anti-Islam, anti-Semitic, and antiLGBTQ+” beliefs (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 6). Individuals and groups seen as
inferior in this hierarchy can be subjected to language that is meant to
dehumanize them and therefore make hate and violence aimed in their direction
easier. These beliefs and language also aim to “preserve the superiority and
dominance of some groups over others” (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 8). The far right
utilizes this language often to target immigrants and nonwhites and they see
demographic changes that will make Europe and North America browner and
blacker as a threat.
This threat is the basis for the far right category Miller-Idriss (2020) refers
to as “existential demographic threats and dystopian conspiracy theories” (p. 9).
Overall, this concern is referred to in the global far right as the “great
replacement.” The “great replacement” specifically is seen as a purposeful global
plan to replace white Christians with nonwhites and non-Christians. The far right
charges that this plan is being carried out by national and global elites,
specifically Jews, who are a popular target of far right conspiracy theorists, both
historically and in the present (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 9). The fear is that due to
immigration and refugees, in addition to demographic patterns like lower birth
rates in European and North American countries, a “white genocide” will occur.
The term “white genocide” is used more often in North America, while in Europe
the term “Eurabia” is more often used to reflect the perceived threat from Muslim
immigration to the continent (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 9). The term “great
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replacement” was created by French far right scholar Renaud Camus in 2011
and has been used as a “framework” to embed the various far right conspiracies
and existential threats (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 9). This shared perception of the
threat of immigration and demographic change is also a unifying one among the
global far right and is seen as a common cause for action (Miller-Idriss, 2020,
p.11; see also Baele et al., 2020). Miller-Idriss (2020) recounts just some of the
recent instances of far right violence where the perpetrator has been inspired by
these ideas: the Norway attack in 2011, the 2019 Christchurch attack, the 2018
Pittsburgh Synagogue attack, and the 2019 El Paso Walmart attack. Indeed, the
killers often reference each other in online writings they post before their attacks.
According to Miller-Idriss (2020), over the last few years an important change has
occurred, the far right does not just use conspiracy theories to “frame far-right
ideas,” rather “they are motivating violent action” (p.12).
The final of Miller-Idriss’s four categories to describe the far right is
apocalyptic fantasies. On the extreme far right, the belief is that the conspiracies
discussed previously will lead to an imminent apocalypse, which some of the far
right want to accelerate. These actors see the coming apocalypse as necessary
to enable the creation of the “ethnostate,” the creation of a white, Christian
homeland. Accelerationists want to speed up this process by instigating societal
chaos, sometimes expressed by the desire to engage in race war (in America)
and to bring on the collapse of democratic government, or Day X (in Germany)
(Bennhold, K., 2021).
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In this paper, the term “far right” will be used to discuss the individuals and
groups that follow, engage in, and believe the phenomena described in the
previous section. Among the literature and scholars, there is no one accepted
term for this phenomenon. Idriss-Miller’s (2020) discussion of contested labels
stresses that the label “far right” is the “best bad term” available and that it “must
always be used and understood as representing a spectrum of beliefs and
approaches” (p. 18).

What Makes the Far Right Extremist?
Extremism researcher JM Berger’s (2018) definition of extremism “refers
to the belief that an in-group’s success or survival can never be separated from
the need for hostile action against the out-group” (p. 44). Utilizing Henri Tajfel
and John C. Turner’s (1978) Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,
Berger has created a framework for understanding extremism. Berger (2018)
builds on Tajfel and Turner’s (1978) ideas of in-groups and out-groups. Berger
(2018) explains that identity is something that is created, and people often
identify with many groups based on different ways they see themselves; they are
part of in-groups based on the perception of a shared identity (p. 6). These
groups can be simple, for example based on living in a common city, or being
fans of the same sports teams. However, some in-groups are more involved and
over time details and events experienced by the groups collate into an in-group
narrative (Berger, 2018, p. 53). Parallel to an in-group’s development is the
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development of the out-group, those not eligible for in-group status. Berger
(2018) notes that extremist in-groups clearly define boundaries regarding who
qualifies for the in-group, more so than non-extremist in-groups, where
boundaries may be blurrier and of lower stake. An extremist in-group eliminates
“gray areas” by explicitly outlining the answers to the following questions:
What makes an individual part of the group, why the in-group has
legitimacy, what makes an individual part of the out-group, why the outgroup is less legitimate than the in-group, and how members of the ingroup should interact with members of the out-group? (p. 53).
The in-group builds its own identity by addressing these questions and by
creating and articulating its beliefs, traits, and practices. The practices of the ingroup are formed from past, current, and future behavior. Berger (2018) argues
that over time, this all coalesces into the in-group’s “story of us” (p. 54).
For extremist in-groups, the story of the out-group, though, is created and
viewed much differently. Since none of the in-group members are part of the outgroup, firsthand knowledge is often lacking and information about the out-group
is often based on less reliable sources. Further, Berger notes that the in-group’s
definition of the out-group tends to be negative, even toxic, and the in-group
highlights negative data about the out-group while rebutting or ignoring positive
data. The story of the out-group “usually includes a mix of truth, interpretation,
and fiction” (p. 57). This dynamic is only considered extremist, following Berger’s
framework, if the in-group asserts that hostile action must be taken against the
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out-group, because they believe that otherwise the success and survival of the
in-group cannot be assured. This is the line that Berger uses to delineate hate or
run of the mill in-group/out-group tensions, or even some forms of violence, from
extremism: hostile action. Hostile actions range from shunning and discrimination
to violence and at the extreme, genocide.
Extremist in-groups frame the need for hostile action as a solution to a
crisis. The crisis arises from the “belief an out-group must be impeding the ingroup’s success in some way, and that impedance proceeds from the intrinsic
identity of the out-group” (Berger, 2018, p. 76). There are five common crisis
narratives identified by Berger: impurity, conspiracy, dystopia, existential threat
and apocalypse (pps. 82-83). Since extremists believe the out-group is impeding
the success of the in-group through these actions that comprise the crisis
narratives, the in-groups propose the required solution. Solutions, as articulated
the extremists, include harassment, discrimination, segregation, hate crimes,
terrorism, oppression, war and genocide (Berger, 2018, pps. 99-100).
Returning to Cynthia Idriss-Miller’s four overlapping categories of the far
right, it is helpful to place them within Berger’s extremist framework (Miller-Idriss
uses Berger’s definition of extremism in her work Hate in the Homeland). For
those who identify with the “antigovernment and antidemocratic practices and
ideals” in-group, the government and those who support it are seen as the outgroup and hostile actions are taken to try to undermine and ultimately destroy
democratic governments. We see this both in the United States with the rising
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popularity of groups like the Oath Keepers (Jackson, 2020), who helped plan the
January 6, 2021, attack on the US capitol building (Follman & Friedman,
2021) and in Germany with far right infiltration of law enforcement and military.
Personnel clandestinely join far right groups that aim to eliminate Germany’s
democratic government, which will occur on the much anticipated Day X. This
has led to the disbandment of an elite military unit, reorganizations of police
units, expulsions from the force, and criminal trials (Bennhold, K., 2021).
The far right category of exclusionary beliefs encompasses a large variety
of extremist groups where the in-group hates and targets the out-group (or
groups) for hostile action due to their identity. Popular targets today include Black
Lives Matter, LGBTQ+ individuals and groups, Asian Americans (a renewed
target as a result of anti-Asian rhetoric related to the Covid 19 pandemic), Jews,
women perceived to be or self-identified as feminists, and Muslims.
Ethnonationalism is a potent force that is not only growing amongst “whites” in
North America and Europe, but also in India as Hindu nationalists on the right
target Muslims, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Leidig, 2020, February;
Roy, 2021).
Currently the in-group that best exemplifies existential threats and
conspiracies category of the far right is QAnon. While there are many narratives
amongst QAnon beliefs, essential to them all is that Democratic elites in the
United States and Hollywood actors are part of a “cabal” that former President
Donald Trump will save the world from. This conspiracy theory has spread from
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the United States to Europe, finding popularity especially in France (Gilbert,
2021). Many of the attackers on the US Capitol on January 6 were followers of
QAnon (Rubin et al., 2021). The followers of Q, who is believed to have had top
level access to government secrets, refer to “the storm” as the day when the evil
elites will be taken down by the return of Donald Trump. This leads to the last
category, apocalyptic fantasies. Those that fall in this in-group want to accelerate
what they see as the inevitable end. Often this means that their self-identified ingroup, usually white, Christian and patriarchal will assume power, which means
there would be several out-groups, all of whom would be eliminated, by violence
in a race war, a revolution, or by sending them elsewhere.

Historical Overview of the Online Presence of the Far Right
The far right adopted the use of the internet early. By 1984 there were
three different computer bulletin board systems (BBS): Info. International
Network, Aryan Liberty Net, and White Aryan Resistance (W.A.R.) Net (Berlet,
2001). These early online far right networks were a way for individuals with home
computers, modems, and phone lines to dial into and log onto the BBS system.
On the BBS, individuals were able to access a directory of files for download.
Features that were quickly added included the ability to post public messages,
read text, and exchange group files (Berlet, 2001). The very first far right BBS
was created by George P. Dietz, a well-known publisher of antisemitic and racist
works, whose welcome message on the site said it was “The only computer
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bulletin board system and uncontrolled information medium in the United States
of America dedicated to the dissemination of historical facts—not fiction!” (Berlet,
2001, p. 2). Launched in March of 1984, by June of that same year the directory
of the BBS listed ten different sections of information, including sections entitled:
“Holocaust: Fact or Fiction?” “The Jew in Review,” and “On Race and Religion”
(Berlet, 2001, p. 2). Shortly after the creation of Dietz’s BBS, Klan leader and
influential far right personality, Louis Beam launched Aryan Liberty Net, with the
help (and probably funds) of Richard Butler, the leader of the Aryan Nations
Christian Identity located in Hayden Lake, Idaho (Berlet, 2001; ADL, 1985). This
BBS posted the following all caps message in June of 1985:
FINALLY, WE ARE ALL GOING TO BE LINKED TOGETHER AT ONE
POINT IN TIME. IMAGINE IF YOU WILL, ALL OF THE GREAT MINDS
OF THE PATRIOTIC CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT LINKED TOGETHER
AND JOINED INTO ONE COMPUTER. ALL THE YEARS OF COMBINED
EXPERIENCE AVAILABLE TO THE MOVEMENT. NOW IMAGINE
BEING ABLE TO CALL UP AND ACCESS THOSE MINDS, TO DEAL
WITH THE PROBLEMS AND ISSUES THAT AFFECT HIM. YOU ARE
ONLINE WITH THE ARYAN NATIONS BRAIN TRUST. IT IS HERE TO
SERVE THE FOLK. (Berlet, 2001, p. 4).
One of the goals of the BBS, according to Beam, was to allow users in Canada
and Europe, where much of the hate literature was censored, access to it
(ADL, 1985). White Aryan Resistance leader Tom Metzger noted that “White

12

Aryan comrades of the North have destroyed the free speech blackout to our
Canadian comrades” (Berlet, 2001, p. 4), and when he created the W.A.R.
Computer Terminal BBS by late 1984 or early 1985, he sent out a message to
“any Aryan patriot in America” (Berlet, 2001, p. 4). From the start the far right
presence on the internet was not only to spread hate and propaganda, but also
to create transnational collaboration.
From that point the far right expanded into the internet with the innovation
of web 1.0, these are the earliest type of websites that were read only, though
over time they became more involved with links and more engaging audiovisual
content (Baele et al., 2020). The most influential was probably Stormfront, a
white supremacist website and message board created by Ku Klux Klan leader
Don Black. Stormfront is still active and counts over 800,000 monthly visits as
well as providing 1,800 interlinked websites (Stern, 2019). Types of far right
examples of web 1.0 include websites that provide far right content, blogs that do
the same as well as offer commentary, far right publishers, and far right
commercial sites selling merchandise (Baele, et al, 2020). The far right were also
early adopters of web 2.0, or platforms centered around user driven content and
interactions (Conway et al., 2019). Popular sites include Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, Telegram, and Reddit. When the bigger names in social media have
deplatformed far right actors and groups, some have migrated to newer, less
used social media platforms like Gab, Parler, and Discord. Other forums, like the
various “chans” offer anonymous spaces for far right activity (Baele et al, 2020).
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Less well known and studied are the far right wikis, in which are far right versions
of encyclopedias and are even translated into several languages (Baele et al.,
2020).

Imagery Types
Imagery is foundational to the far right and it is both prominent and prolific
in both physical and cyberspaces. For the purposes of this study, imagery is
observed to determine how it facilitates the interaction between cyber and
physical spaces. Two areas are of importance: the types of imagery and the
medium on which the imagery is presented. In the literature review of the
following chapter, these two facets of imagery are further explored.

Summary
The far right is a multi-faceted, heterogenous extremist movement that
has increased its presence online and in physical spaces. The following chapters
of this thesis include a literature review of the far right, using theoretical
frameworks from social science and studies conducted among the far right
regarding online spaces, offline spaces, and the imagery types and mediums,
followed by chapters on the methods and results of the audio and visual analysis
conducted to explore the research question. The study closes with a section of
conclusions and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
In this chapter, research will focus first on theoretical frameworks to help
understand the far right. Following the theoretical frameworks is a discussion of
how cyberspace is utilized by the far right and how this helps with efforts at
transnationalization. Then the use of imagery is explored, both the types of
imagery and the mediums on which they are presented. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of imagery and its role in facilitating interaction between cyber
and real life spaces.

Theoretical Frameworks Useful in Understanding the Far Right:
Landscapes, the Imaginary, and Ecosystems
Extremism research has concentrated on jihadist terrorism (Berger, 2018),
however of late there has been increased focus on far right extremism (Baele et
al., 2020). The rise of far right violence, the growth of the far right presence on
the internet, and the growth and visibility of far right events in the real world—
Charlottesville and Jan. 6, 2021—all likely have influenced the growth of
academic research and the attention of journalists. Recent work (Belew, 2018)
has shined the light on the fact that the far right, far from disappearing, has had a
steady, if at times low profile, presence since at least the early 1980s. After
Timothy McVeigh’s attack on the Edward P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City

15

and the law enforcement takedown of The Order, far right groups in the United
States primarily adopted a decentralized structure to prevent law enforcement
infiltration and investigations (Belew, 2018). While to the general public—and
perhaps law enforcement—this, plus the aftermath of September 11, 2001,
directed attention away from far right extremists, the movement continued to
grow. A major factor in the growth of the far right has been the internet. Far right
white supremacists and white nationalists used the internet quite early, before
the general public, to sustain and grow their ranks (Gerstenfeld et al., 2003).
Another early goal was to create and maintain international links (Berlet, 2001;
Gerstenfeld et al., 2003). As the internet transformed from basic sites to user
generated sites like social media platforms, the far right moved right along with
those changes, successfully creating a presence on mainstream sites like
Facebook and Twitter as well as on more obscure spaces like “chans” and
dedicated discussion forums (e.g., Iron March).
To aid in the analysis of the transnational and increasingly global
movements of ideas and people of the far right, both in physical and virtual
spaces, Anthropologist Arjun Appardurai’s (1996) conceptual framework of global
landscapes is helpful. Appadurai (1996) theorizes five global “landscapes,” which
he describes as “fluid, irregular” flows and “deeply perspectival constructs,
inflected by historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of
actors'' (p. 33). Among the five, ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes,
mediascapes, and ideoscapes, the last two are most relevant to this analysis of
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the far right. Mediascapes “refer both to the distribution of the electronic
capabilities to produce and disseminate information” while ideoscapes are also
concerned with images, they are political in nature “and frequently have to do
with the ideologies of states and the counter ideologies of movements explicitly
oriented at capturing state power or a piece of it” (Appadurai, 1996, pps. 35-36).
The extreme far right’s ultimate goal is to capture state power and to rework
society and create a white ethnostate. This framework allows for not only the
discussion of the flows of ideas, but also for the instances where connections are
lacking, which Appadurai (1996) labels as “disjunctures.” Among the far right the
rhetoric is anti-globalist (Caiani & Kröll, 2015; Stern, 2019), however a
disjuncture exists as they see the people of other places as the threat, as
evidenced by the anti-Muslim, anti-refugee rhetoric, rather than the effects of late
stage capitalism. Appadurai (1996) regards the scapes as the “building blocks'' of
the global imaginary. Working from Benedict Anderson’s (2006) theory the
“imagined communities,” Appadurai (1996) writes that “the imagination has
become an organized field of social practices, a form of work (in the sense of
both labor and culturally organized practice) and a form of negotiation between
sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of possibility” (p. 31). The
imaginary is a potent force for the far right (Miller-Idriss, 2020; Stern, 2019). The
idealized past and the hoped for future exist simultaneously in the far right
imagination, and it can be seen explicitly with the use of images that harken back
to a mythical past (Miller-Idriss, 2020). The imaginary gives space for the

17

expression of foundational issues, such as “territory, belonging, exclusion, race,
and national geographies” (Miller-Idriss, 2020). The extreme right’s envisioned
ethnostate is a powerful imaginary, with numerous written works laying out its
creation, most notably William Luther Pierce’s The Turner Diaries. The far right
imaginary as a building block of global mediascapes and ideoscapes implies
disjuncture as it is a retreat from the global, an attempt at carving out a space
that is homogenous among an increasingly diverse world. Today those spaces
are online and offline in the form of specific events, while the future imagined
ethnostate is a physical space, one that is being envisioned and discussed in
online spaces in the present.
Place and space are important settings for the far right. Place is usually
the ethnonationalist homeland that various far right movements claim based on
their interpretation of history (Stern, 2019), and the physical site of the imagined
ethnostate, but spaces offer so much more room for ideas and expression.
Spaces are relational (Mazúr & Urbánek, 1983; Thrift, 2003) and filled by people
and ideas, while the people and ideas are in return formed by spaces. As
geographers Mazúr and Urbánek (1983) note, space is “‘filled’ with qualities
given by interrelationships of elements of the landscape system and expressed
by its structure” (p. 142). While not referring to Appadurai’s landscape
framework, this notion fits well within the far right internet ecosystem as a
landscape of ideas and images that inform and shape people and ideas, and in
return the people continue to shape their spaces as a result of their interaction
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with far right spaces on the internet. Further, as evidenced by the proliferation of
fringe social media sites developed to replace access for individuals and groups
that have been deplatformed for hate speech or threats of violence (Scott, 2020),
the structure of spaces of the far right are created to follow the demand of new
spaces, to enable them to continue their flows of ideas and images.
Free spaces are places where groups like the far right can be themselves
without the pressure from the dominant group (Polletta, 1999). White Power
Movement researchers Pete Simi and Robert Futrell (2006) expanded on the
idea of free spaces refined by Francesca Polletta (1999) to create a framework
for analyzing these spaces in the far right White Power movement. The authors
used a multi-method approach to collect ethnographic data between 1996 and
2005. Methods included 107 in-depth face to face and telephone interviews,
participant observation of events, and content analysis of 48 websites and four
internet forum groups (Simi & Futrell, 2006). They outlined three types of free
spaces: home, event, and cyber (2006). Home is the main free space for the
nurturing and continuation of the White Power movement (WPM) culture as this
is where it is directly taught and reinforced through families, especially to their
children. Events, particularly congresses, conferences and music festivals,
represent larger scale free spaces, although because of the controversial nature
of WPM beliefs, secrecy and use of private lands are essential to the success of
these events. Cyberspace represents a free space that the authors argue is
“intertwined” with real world free spaces (Simi & Futrell, 2006, p. 115), rather
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than comprising its own separate sphere. The authors describe several linkages
between online spaces and real world spaces, including those that connect
different WPM groups, create opportunities for continued activism and
participation, facilitate logistical planning of events, report on real world events
and “provide access to an array of WPM cultural items” (Simi & Futrell, 2006, p.
119). The authors further report that the largest real world events were those that
had the most extensive online presence (Simi & Futrell, 2006, p. 134).
The Far Right's online presence has grown considerably since Simi and
Futrell’s work in the early 2000s (Conway et al., 2019). Today, the number of far
right spaces on the internet makes a comprehensive mapping of the entire entity
an unwieldy task. Rather, an analytical framework can help make sense of it.
Baele, Brace, and Coan (2020) offer a useful one. The researchers describe the
far right presence online as an “ecosystem’ (p. 2), an “entity made of an everchanging number of different components whose natures and interconnections
are in constant evolution (as opposed to a static landscape made of a fixed
number of well defined objects)” (p. 2). The authors further delineate the four
levels of the far right ecosystem. At the simplest level are the “entities,” or
individual domains, examples include blogs and Facebook group pages.
“Communities” consist of “entities” that are linked: through hyperlinks, content
flows, and user migration flows (p. 4). The “communities” are dynamic, both
organically and strategically formed, and the “overall far-right ecosystem may
thus be understood as a network made of a multitude of communities of linked
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entities” (p. 4). Communities can be organized by type into “biotopes,” and the
authors adopt Davey et al.’s five suggested categories for the far right
ecosystem: white supremacists, ethno-nationalists, militia-groups (antistate/government), the “manosphere,” and the alt-right (p. 4). Biotopes overlap
and reflect the dynamic nature of the internet. Together the biotopes constitute
the far right “ecosystem.” Internet culture is ever changing, and this creates
difficulties in analysis, therefore this analytical framework is useful in creating a
language for organization and analysis beyond what is currently relevant
amongst the far right internet ecosystem, whether it be blogs that are popular or
fringe social media sites that emerge after a deplatforming. In addition to offering
this analytical framework, Baele et al. suggest a research agenda, as the rise in
far right extremism has resulted in increased academic attention and given the
dearth of previous research as compared to other types of extremism, particularly
jihadist extremism.
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Figure. 1 Far-Right Online Ecosystem (Baele et al., 2020, p. 5)

Cyberspace and Growing Transnational Ties Among the Far Right
The far right uses the online ecosystem for the purposes of attracting new
adherents, continuing engagement, fellowship, and coordination and the growing
transnational nature of this landscape is reflected in all these areas of purpose.
Since the early bulletin board systems of white nationalists in the US, the far right
has utilized the internet to make transnational connections (ADL, 185; Berlet,
2001). Stormfront, the oldest major far right website, has sections labeled by
country and numerous links to international far right websites (Bowman-Grieve,
2009). Recent research has found that the far right has used Twitter effectively to
engage in transnational anti-immigrant and protectionist economic policy
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discourse (Froio & Ganesh, 2019). A recent leak from the web forum Iron March,
now defunct, reveals major collaboration between far right individuals connected
to Atomwaffen. Iron March grew out an earlier version called International Third
Position Forum, which “was launched by a Russian, produced a terror group in
the U.S., and facilitated coordination among terror groupings in the U.K. and
elsewhere, all through the power of the internet” (Ross et al., 2019). Extremism
researchers Manuela Caiani and Patricia Kröll (2015) investigated “the degree
and forms of extreme far right transnationalization (in terms of mobilization,
issues, targets, action strategies, and organizational contacts) and the potential
role of the internet in these developments'' (p. 331). The research involved
interviews with 54 representatives of six right wing organizations within Europe
and the United States in addition to conducting a formalized web content analysis
of 336 far right websites. They found that while most far right actions take place
at the local level, the transnational landscape is growing, widespread and that the
internet is assisting this process in three ways: increasing supranational targets,
giving opportunity to “stage supranational organization,” and the creation of new
transnational organizations (p. 343). The far right in the United States is the most
transnationalized, however a particularly close relationship between the British
and French far right exists which is constituted by both online and offline spaces,
and in Germany the far right actors which most used the web were also most
effective in “staging transnational activities'' (p. 343). The internet is used as a
tool, both on the local and transnational level, to “attract new members...
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propagate their ideals among like-minded people, and connect individuals and
organizations'' (p. 343).
Connections built online lead to real world transnational meetings. In the
past, music festivals, particularly in Europe, were popular far right events that
would draw an audience from overseas (Yousef, 2020). Recently, Mixed Martial
Arts (MMA) events hosted by far right individuals in Europe also tend to draw
international participants (Miller-Idriss, 2020). Far right actors from the United
States have trained in the Ukraine (Rotella, 2021). Far right politicians in Europe
are also engaging in transnational connections. In 2019, a group of 23, of whom
most were from far right political parties, visited Kashmir, the site of contested
land between India and Pakistan (Leidig, 2020, January 21). Far right
connections between North America and Europe have existed for decades, it
appears these connections are growing, in addition to branching out in solidarity
with more far flung countries, as with India.

The Role of Imagery
Language is an obstacle for transnational communication. The far right’s
use of imagery is one way to overcome this block. In Europe, far right imagery in
the form of a cartoon was effective in spreading messaging across language
barriers (Doerr, 2017). Researcher Nicole Doerr analyzed anti-immigrant
cartoons originally produced in Switzerland, and how those images were
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understood and transferred to audiences in Germany and Italy to show a sense
of anti-immigrant solidarity between the far right of those nations (Doerr, 2017).
Far right imagery is prevalent and prominent in both online and offline
spaces. Online mostly in the form of memes and offline on flags, t-shirts, stickers,
patches, pins, and even tattoos. Most far right memes are created in the
anonymous “chans” and then flow through other online entities as users visit
other online far right spaces and share them (Baele et al., 2020). Many of the
memes include imagery that is created by ever changing internet culture, for
example the Boogaloo Bois preference for igloos and Hawaiian shirts. Neither
igloos nor Hawaiian shirts have any historic tie to far right ideology or symbolism.
Some memes have staying power, most significantly Pepe the Frog, an early
internet meme that was appropriated by the far right, and the Red Pill memes,
signifying an awakening to the far right cause, which originated from the Matrix
movie series (Stern, 2021). The origins of some far right imagery, like Nazi and
Confederate symbols, are historic and predate the internet. This imagery has
become less visible, however, since many among the far right realize that the
extreme nature of these symbols might turn away potential adherents who might
need a softer, less controversial entry into the far right (Stern, 2019). The far right
is reaching even further into the past to use Norse and Celtic imagery as
symbolic of white European civilization and their perceived need to preserve and
protect it (Miller-Idriss, 2020). This imagery appears in both Europe and North
America. These images have made their way into contemporary online spaces,
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as well as being a staple on physical items like t-shirts and flags. Online stores
have flourished, and the quality of the merchandise has improved. In the past,
shirts were often screen printed and of low quality. Today over a dozen high
quality, far right clothing brands exist, sold on sophisticated websites that include
currency converters for international customers (Miller-Idriss, 2020). There is also
evidence of transnational solidarity in this arena: a Polish website sell shirts
emblazoned with the Confederate flag, while in Russia images of Germanic
history like Vikings are popular (Miller-Idriss, 2020). In the U.S., the Proud Boys
and Oath Keepers both have high quality, original clothing and imagery. Public
events and protests throughout 2020 featured both groups present in gear that
was easily recognizable and highly visible.
In the United States, support among the far right for former President
Donald Trump is strong and pro Trump flags, shirts, and hats are ubiquitous at
rallies and events frequented by the far right, as are American flags, American
historical flags and symbols. Researcher Cynthia Miller-Idriss writes:
Hate clothing celebrates violence in the name of a cause---often using
patriotic images and phrases and calls to act like an American, along with
Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, and white-supremacist messages. In this way,
far-right clothing links patriotism with violence and xenophobia. (2020, p.
80)

26

While it is likely impossible to determine if someone wearing American patriotic
gear is a member or sympathizer of the far right, the far right does use American
patriotic imagery (Miller-Idriss, 2020).

Summary
The far right can be better understood by applying theoretical frameworks
from the social sciences. It is not a monolithic set of groups and actors, rather a
large movement tied together by various far right ideologies. International ties
were undertaken early using the power of the internet, and research shows these
ties are growing and even branching out from the western world. The presence of
the far right on the internet is both historical and of contemporary concern. The
goal of this study is to add to the discussion of how online spaces are used
together with physical spaces and the role of imagery in facilitating those
processes. While Simi and Futrell found that far right cyber and real world spaces
are “intertwined” (2006), there is a lack of research regarding the role of imagery
in this process. Miller-Idriss contends, “that symbols and iconography move
between online and offline spaces as they are deployed and co-opted by the far
right in ways that deserve our close attention” (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 133). She
suggests, “more empirical research is needed to disentangle variations in the
utility of symbols in offline and online spaces for insider and outsider recognition,
communication of far-right messages, and the degree of commitment they
require to far right ideas” (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 133). The visual and audio
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analysis in the next chapter is an attempt to help understand how imagery was
used on the events of January 6, 2021, at the U.S. Capitol where both offline and
online spaces were used by the far right.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODS

Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the ways in which far right cyber
spaces and real life spaces are used in tandem and how images facilitate the use
of those spaces. For the purposes of this study, it was determined that the safest
and most reliable way to procure data would be from third party sources. The
shorter time length of this study did not allow for inroads and relationships to be
created with far right actors in order to engage in interviews or distribute surveys.
Additionally, while research for this project was being conducted, the events of
January 6, 2021, occurred at the United States Capitol building. Video recordings
of the events by participants were played by the media and reports signaled that
the day’s participants, including far right groups and actors, planned the events
using the internet (Lytvynenko & Hensley-Clancy, 2021). Significantly, the public
contents of Parler, a web platform popular with the far right (Katz, 2020), were
saved to the internet archive by a group of internet activists prior to the service
losing its Amazon Web Services hosting and its app being removed from the
Google and Apple app stores (Wong & Morse, 2021). This deplatforming was a
direct result of the Parler’s inaction in dealing with the violent and insurrectionist
content on January 6, 2021 (Wong & Morse, 2021). According to the internet
programmers that—anonymously—uploaded the data, this cache consisted of
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99% of Parler’s public contents, including thousands of recordings from the
January 6, 2021, incident. Of these thousands of video recordings, investigative
journalism non-profit ProPublica released 500 as an effort to provide data to the
public (Klein & Kao, 2021). This database provided by ProPublica was used to
complete the audio and visual analysis for this thesis based on the use of this
platform by far right groups and individuals, its accessibility, and the historical
importance of the events of January 6, 2021, at the United States Capitol
building.

Research Design
For this thesis, an audio and visual analysis was conducted on 100 of the
500 Parler video recordings of January 6, 2020, that were provided in the
ProPublica database. A flaw in Parler’s code at the time of the site’s content
retrieval not only made the recordings—and other content—easy to access and
save, but it also included the videos original geolocation and time stamps
(Greenberg, 2021). Using that information, ProPublica’s database provided each
video recording with a time and label by location: around Capitol, near Capitol,
and inside Capitol. The first video posted on the database was recorded at 12:01
PM Eastern Standard Time while the last video posted was recorded at 5:39 PM
Eastern Standard Time. Each video recording was analyzed to determine which,
if any, symbols or imagery were present on individuals and the flags flown by
individuals. Additionally, an audio analysis was conducted on each video: when
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individuals “selfie” narrated the event, or were clearly heard behind the recording
device, the contents of the narration were either collected word for word (shorter
recordings) or summarized with some quotes recorded (longer, repetitive
recordings).

Sampling and Procedures
Data was collected by generating 100 random numbers out of 500 using
an internet random number generator (Urbaniak & Plous, 2021). Random
sampling was chosen as it seemed the best way to capture a representative slice
of the 500 videos. Utilizing a Google Form format, each of the 100 videos was
analyzed for the following: flags, hats/beanies, clothing (shirts/pants/jackets),
pins/patches, chants/songs, and narration. An individual Google form was filled
out for each video. When these items were observed or heard, a check mark
notation system was used to record imagery and words used. Additional checks
were not added if more than one of the same item was viewed. Under each
category listed above were the descriptive analysis markers: Pro Trump,
American, Anti-Biden, Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Gadsden, Confederate,
QAnon, American Betsy Ross, Three Percent Flag, and America First, and
others, with some slight variation among the categories (see Appendix A). Using
the Google form allowed for additional descriptive markers to be included as
needed during the analysis, but no markers were removed during the process. A
handwritten list was also created to cross reference the sample number with the
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timestamp and length of the video, and its place out of the 500 videos. This step
was necessary because ProPublica’s database did not number the videos,
however the videos were posted in sequential order by time of day and sorted by
location. Each video was viewed at least twice, many were viewed five or more
times, depending on the length and content of the video. Once all 100 videos
were viewed and their associated Google forms were submitted, the data was
then available in several formats: summaries of each question (including charts
and graphs), by question, and by individual entry. A Google Sheet spreadsheet
was also auto generated after the last form was submitted. This allowed for both
visual and textual data analysis.
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses were conducted on the video
recordings. However, it must be noted that the quantitative analysis is not meant
to be a full record of the types and numbers of imagery present on January 6,
2021, at the US Capitol. Since the videos were often of the same crowd spaces
but from various individuals reflecting their position in the crowd, the scenes must
show the same individuals and flags, therefore a counting was deemed
unrealistic and prone to error. The same is true for some of the chants recorded
in videos from the same crowd space and at around the same time. Rather, the
point is to provide a qualitative analysis of the day, specifically checking for
markers of far right groups and actors, including imagery and rhetoric, and
reflecting on how these markers facilitate the use of both real life and cyber
spaces. It is likely that the events of January 6, 2021, at the US Capitol will be
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researched and analyzed for years to come. Several news analyses have been
published in just the few months since and undoubtedly much academic research
is ongoing. This small study is meant to add to the discussion of the events of the
day, specifically how cyberspace and real life space became one during the
event and how imagery was used in this space.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FINDINGS

Introduction
This study is an analysis of videos taken on January 6, 2021, around,
nearby, and inside the United States Capitol building and posted to the social
media platform Parler by participants of that event. Audio and visual analysis was
conducted on 100 videos to determine what, if any, far right imagery and rhetoric
was used by participants of January 6 as they recorded themselves and others.
The videos represent a merging of cyber and real life spaces. The results of the
analysis show the predominant imagery visible during the incident was pro
Trump, followed by the American flag imagery. The results also show a distinct
lack of imagery from far right groups that were known to be at the Capitol that
day. Finally, the audio analysis provides a narrative window into the actions of
the participants of January 6 as the cyber and real life space intertwined to
become one space. The following sections examine the results of the visual
analysis, followed by audio analysis, discussion of findings, and study
limitations.
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Analysis Findings
Of the 100 videos studied, most were recorded near the Capitol, followed
by around the Capitol, and inside the Capitol. The following chart details the
numerical breakdown:

Pie chart auto generated by Google Forms

Figure 2. Video Recordings by Location
The full 500 videos posted by ProPublica (Groeger et al., 2021) also are majority
near, followed by around, and inside which affirms the random sample as being
representative as far as location.
Visual Analysis Findings
The visual analysis of the flags, garments, hats/beanies, and patches and
pins shows pro Trump and American Flag designs to be the most prevalent
imagery visible from the January 6 videos of the Capitol. The Gadsden Flag and
the Betsy Ross flag were also popular images. Little far right imagery was easily
spotted in the videos. Oath Keepers imagery made a small appearance, the
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Proud Boys, even smaller with just one sighting, as well as a few Kekistan flags
(alt-right imagery), though the far right group with the greatest visible presence
as far as imagery was America First.
The weather on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C was in the low 40s
Fahrenheit between the hours of 12 PM and 6 PM. The weather likely influenced
the prevalence of beanies, hats, and coats. The great majority of beanies and
Make America Great Again (MAGA) hats appeared identical; perhaps many were
bought at concession stands at the rally before the march to the Capitol.
Overcoats covered many people’s shirts, leading to difficulty in seeing t-shirts for
analysis. Patches and pins were also hard to see for the same reason in addition
to the relatively unsophisticated software and computer used for this analysis. It
was difficult to focus and zoom in on items as small as patches and pins,
particularly given the crowd sizes in some of the video clips. Overall, as the
figures below demonstrate, most imagery present on January 6, 2021, at the US
Capitol was pro Trump and American flag related. This finding is reflective of the
known agendas of the far right groups at the Capitol that day. While there was
scant far right imagery, there was a lot of nondescript, camouflage and tactical
gear. These were not categories analyzed in the study; however, they were
noticeable, along with the lack of far right imagery that had been prevalent at
other “Stop the Steal” related events leading up to the events at the Capitol on
Jan. 6. It is also known from law enforcement arrests (Kunzelman & Durkin
Richer, 2021) that far right actors both planned and executed attacks that day.
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Table 1. Types of Imagery Shown on Hats and Beanies
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Table 2. Types of Imagery Shown on Flags
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Audio Analysis Findings
Chants and songs could be heard throughout the video recordings of Jan.
6. The two most common chants were “USA!” and “stop the steal!” The National
Anthem was sung a few times and the Pledge of Allegiance was recited. Some of
the chants were only repeated by one or a few people, however they were clearly
heard on the video, so they were recorded for this study. These chants and the
narration, by people both in front of and behind the camera, reflect what are
known to be the events of the day. Earlier in the day, between 1 PM and 2 PM,
the audio analysis shows rhetoric surrounding the election and demands to “stop
the steal” and “let us in,” by midway through the events, between 2 PM and 3PM,
the tone and words changed to reflect the crowd knew the Capitol had been
breached and shouts were heard to help, and videos were then filmed inside the
Capitol, rather than just near or around. After 3 PM, some of the individuals
inside the building are seen leaving, to cheers and congratulations, and law
enforcement are observed arriving to reinforce the Capitol Police.
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Table 3. Chants and Songs

Video recorded at 12:59 PM (Groeger et al., 2021, video 12) near the
Capitol shows a man standing on the steps yelling, “We already voted, and what
have they done? They stole it! We want our fucking country back. Let’s take
it…[unintelligible] come on, come on!” Throughout the clip are shouts by others:
“stop the steal!” “let us in!” “join us!” “all lives matter” “USA!” and “we the people.”
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Seven minutes later, also nearby, a video shows the crowd pushing toward the
building, and a man off camera can be heard saying, “People have taken over
the Capitol building. Storming the walls and storming the Capitol. This is our
house!” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 21). One minute later, at 1:07 PM, a video
was posted from around the Capitol that showed Trump on the big screen telling
the crowd at the “Save America” rally at the Ellipse that “if you don’t fight like hell,
we won’t have a country anymore” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 24). The next
three recordings cover about a thirty minute period between 1:07 PM and 1:35
PM. Various chants are heard: “traitors!” “hold the line!” “USA!” “hands up, don’t
shoot!” and “fuck you!” along with one man who exclaims “It’s a fucking war zone
out here boys!” (Groeger et al., 2021, videos 47, 53, 59). Far right figure Alex
Jones appears on a video at 1:51 PM. He is holding a bullhorn and telling the
crowd to relocate to the other side of the Capitol where he says there are permits
for the event. He called the police “provocateurs” and told the crowd not to
engage with the police and “give the system what they want” (Groeger et al.,
2021, video 79).
At 2:01 PM, a man can be heard yelling during video 100, “They just
breached it. They’re storming the Capitol. Hell yeah!” (Groeger et al., 2021).
Videos filmed over the next ten minutes are full of people encouraging the
Capitol attack. Various directions were given: “Whoo! Yeah! Yeah! Push
forward!” “Fucking go! They need our help” (Groeger et al., 2021, videos 193,
196). Video 122 shows the crowd surging towards the building, and one man can

41

be heard instructing them that “we need to have this area completely occupied.
It’s an easy push forward!” (Groeger et al., 2021). A video posted a minute later
captures a man breaking the windows of the Capitol building before being tackled
by the police. Some in the crowd shout to “leave him alone” while others say, “he
was breaking the law” and to leave the police alone since they are just “doing
their job” (Groeger et al., 2021). At 2:25 PM a man can be heard on recording
171 saying “They got the door open. They got the door open. They’re in” to which
another man replies, “This is our house too, brother” (Groeger et al., 2021). The
chants in the background of several of these videos are “stop the steal” and
“USA!”
The first video of the sample set from inside the Capitol occurred at 2:34
PM and it consists of a man yelling, “Where are the fucking traitors? Drag them
out by their fucking hair. Where are the fucking traitors?” after which someone
near his voice replied, “Come on, who’s first?” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 209).
A minute later a man can be heard in another video from inside the Capitol
yelling, “You’ve paid for this. Hey, cover your face. Let’s go!” (Groeger et al.,
2021, video 215). The videos posted in and near the Capitol at this point—
between 2 PM and 3 PM—are the densest in terms of amount per minute. Most
show the crowd pushing up against the Capitol. One video, however, is further
away and the Capitol building can be seen in the near distance. The video shows
a young man in a suit and tie, possibly far right leader Nick Fuentes, speaking to
the crowd with a bullhorn. He is standing on steps, with people around him
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wearing America First (AF) shirts and flying AF flags. He begins with “Honestly, I
think people talk too much about Socialism. The real threat to this country isn’t
socialism, it’s globalism.” He says the country has been taken over by “foreign,
global special interests” and continues his speech “they are attempting to replace
our population,” “that globalism is the antithesis of nationalism,” and that they
“want to erase our borders, erase our identity.” He argues for revolution
contending that he hopes it happens “bloodlessly, or it can take place another
way, either way this American revolution must take place!” (Groeger et al., 2021,
video 242). The crowd cheers.
A man wearing a MAGA hat self-narrates a video near the Capitol at 2:51
PM. He calls the members of Congress “cowards” that “hid inside and were
emergency escorted away because of their fear of the people.” He also calls
former Vice President Pence a “treasonous pig” whose “name will be mud
forever” before concluding with “now the real battle begins” (Groeger et al., 2021,
video 292). During video 329 at 3:01 PM a woman can be heard off screen
saying “This is beautiful. This is awesome…. you know what? This is what
happens when you don’t like us and you didn’t fight for us” as the camera pans
the crowd pushing toward the Capitol (Groeger et al., 2021). Three minutes later
a video shows another woman in a MAGA hat self-narrating her video. She
states:
I’m live at the Capitol building, where we have overtaken the building, and
wondering if the media hears us now? If there is any media here, I don’t
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see any media, Proud Boys are here. I don’t see Antifa. It’s all protestors
saying, “stop the steal.” We climbed the walls; we climbed the scaffolding
and hung an American flag. There’s no violence here, but we’re upset.
The lies, the stealing, needs to end, and our government needs to listen.
Do you hear us now? (Groeger et al., 2021, video 340)
Another three minutes after this video, events begin to transition. Some videos
are still showing the crowd pushing against the police at doors and windows, as
well as videos of participants inside the Capitol, however there is now footage of
individuals leaving the building.
A video showing a line of men leaving the building to cheers and
exclamations of “way to go” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 347) is posted at 3:07
PM. At 3:25 PM the man called the “Q Shaman” by the media—Jake Angeli—is
seen exiting the Capitol while yelling out “freedom,” the crowd responded back
“freedom!” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 399). A few minutes later, a clip shows a
line of police officers in riot gear walking toward the Capitol building and man off
camera yells, “Hey those are good people up there, you don’t need none of that”
(Groeger et al., 2021, video 407). By 3:41 PM police officers can be seen
pushing out the doors of the building, down the steps, and away from the building
as two men behind the camera converse: one states, “They’re leaving” and the
other replies, “I doubt that—they’re letting them down to the bottom so they push
us all back. We’ll see, they’ll play like your friend and stab you in the back”
(Groeger et al., 2021, video 420). The next few videos of the sample have no
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narration, although in one a loud “USA!” chant is heard as the crowd seems like it
is trying to keep the energy up as events appear to be winding down. At 4:01 PM
a man outside the doors of the Capitol is shown on camera speaking through the
bullhorn, “My three kids are going to grow up in this country. And I want them to
respect my house. And that makes us different. We will stand our ground. But the
police are not the problem” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 462). A minute later
another clip shows the crowd singing the first few lines of “Amazing Grace”
before it tapers off and a man behind the camera remarks that no one seems to
know the rest of the lyrics (Groeger et al., 2021, video 463).
The following clip shows a group of men and women walking away from
the event and speaking in Spanish to the camera. They are speaking about their
support for Trump and the cause, as well as their Cuban and Dominican
backgrounds (Groeger et al., 2021, video 471). The final video in the sample also
shows a man who has just left, and he is speaking to the man holding the
camera about a shooting he saw in the Capitol. The man in front of the camera is
probably referencing the shooting of Ashley Babbitt that occurred inside the
Capitol. The man behind the camera claims to be a pastor and he initiates a
prayer over the man’s head. During the prayer he calls the man a “lion” and a
“patriot” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 489).
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Table 4. Narration by Speakers On and Off Camera
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Discussion of Findings
While the above narrative based on the audio analysis does not include all
the narrative events of the day, it is representative of the whole. The visual
analysis is similar in that while a notation system was used to record the various
images, it was not a comprehensive count of imagery. The hope was that this
analysis is still useful in understanding how the physical spaces on January 6,
2021, intertwined and became one with the virtual spaces as participants actively
recorded their and other’s participation in the events of that day, and how the
ubiquitous use of imagery was a part of this process.
The findings from these analyses show that while some far right imagery
was not as visible as in prior “stop the steal” related events, it was still present,
particularly imagery related to far right movements QAnon, America First, Three
Percenters, and Groypers (as those who fly the America First and follow far right
leader Nick Fuentes refer to themselves). While the two high profile groups, Oath
Keepers and Proud Boys, kept their imagery visibility low, their presence and
planning at the event is known. The audio analysis supports this as phrases used
by members of the crowd reflect trained and organized action. These include
directions given such as “cover your face, let’s go,” “we need to have this area
completely occupied, it’s an easy push forward,” “push forward,” and “fucking go,
they need our help” (Groeger et al., 2021). These phrases stood out from other
crowd exclamations like “Whoo,” “Hell yeah,” and those in the back of the crowd
saying things like “they are storming the castle, they are going in, the patriots are
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storming the castle” (Groeger et al., 2021). The phrase “patriots” was used
repeatedly to refer to people in the crowd engaged in attack or by people
referring to themselves as patriots because of their participation that day.
The use of term patriot and the historical imagery often associated with it
among the far right, including the Betsy Ross flag and the Gadsden flag, reflect
the far right’s reverence for times before the current, more diverse era. It also
represents the use of patriotic imagery to reaffirm the far right’s claim to the
ethnonational homelands. It is impossible to discern those in the crowd who were
“normie” Trump supporters, as they are called by the far right, and those who
were far right actors, but both are known to use patriotic imagery. Some of the
flags that day became weapons as videos show individuals using flag poles to
break into the building and beat and push back law enforcement (Groeger et al.,
2021).
The results of the analysis also reveal the tension between far right groups
that support and contain members of law enforcement and those who harbor
antigovernment sentiments. Crowd treatment of law enforcement was a theme
that ran through many of the videos. Some participants implored the crowd to
respect the police while the videos also clearly showed the police being attacked
by the crowds (Groeger et al., 2021). In some videos the crowd can heard
defending those that attacked and entered the building, telling the police to leave
them alone and that they are “good people” (Groeger et al., 2021).
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The most visible far right group on January 6, 2021, were those pushing
the American First ideology. This group is led by Nick Fuentes, likely the young
man speaking on the video. In his speech he referenced the far right theme of
the great replacement. While he did not speak those words, the substance of his
talk reflected the idea (Groeger et al., 2021, video 340). He spoke with a crowd
around and in front of him, many wearing AF hats and holding AF flags. The
crowd facing him was filled with individuals filming the talk, at least one of which
was posted to social media as it was happening. This video represents to best
example of how cyberspace, physical space, and imagery combined into one
dynamic.
January 6, 2021 was only one event of many frequented by the far right
just over the last year. The use of social media by the participants, both videos
and textual posts, during the events of that day provide a window into how the far
right uses imagery in both offline and online spaces, and how those two spaces
come together. As evidenced by the results and discussion above, the cyber and
physical space more than intertwined, they became on and the same on January
6, 2021 at the United States Capitol building.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Research Question
This study began two years ago as an exploration of phenomena
observed in the local community. Why were there so many flags and symbols
around town, on yards, houses, and even vehicles? Additionally, what did it
mean when they appeared to be removed, only to go back up a few days later? It
happened so much that it begged the question: was something being
communicated? This led to research into the far right and development of the
research question: how do far right online and offline spaces work in tandem and
how does imagery facilitate this process? The hypothesis was that the spaces
work together, and imagery helps spur participation and solidarity.

Cyberspace, Physical Space, and Imagery
A visual and audio analysis of 100 videos posted to Parler by participants
of the attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, revealed that these two
spaces not only were intertwined as previous research (Simi & Futrell, 2006) has
shown, but the two spaces seemed to meld into one. The number of posts, just to
Parler, not even including posts to other social media platforms, and the prolific
use of imagery illustrated how the physical space being occupied by far right
actors was concurrently existing in the virtual world. This analysis also
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demonstrated the rift in the far right between those who support law enforcement
and those who are antigovernment. Another important finding was the presence
of American First pushing their anti-globalism, anti-immigrant ideology.

Study Limitations
This study has several limitations. The content under analysis was
sourced from a third party, ProPublica. While ProPublica is a trusted public
resource, this study was confined to videos ProPublica previously sorted and
found relevant to the events of January 6, 2021. This analysis would have also
benefitted from first person ethnographic work at the Capitol on January 6. That
was beyond the scope of this paper however, and it could have been a
dangerous undertaking. Another improvement would have been to interview and
send surveys to participants to hear their perspective of events. This study was
also conducted using non sophisticated computer equipment and software that
affected the level of analysis possible. Advanced computer programs that can do
image recognition would have improved the analysis.

Recommendations
Given the research limitations discussed above, more research into this
topic is essential. As extremism scholar Cynthia Miller-Idriss notes, “the visual
nature of online spaces might suggest that their use will only accelerate in the
years to come” (2020, p. 133). With the proliferation of websites that offer far
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right imagery for sale, the use of social media platforms, including the creation of
new platforms to host actors and groups who have been kicked from mainstream
sites, and the continued political polarization in the United States, it is likely that
more incidents will occur that will provide the opportunity for further analysis.
Hopefully, the violence and threat to American democracy witnessed on January
6 will not be repeated. Recent research by J.M. Berger (2021), however,
illustrates that violence from the far right might get worse. The threat from
accelerationists is real and Berger finds a current theme among the far right is
self-criticism: they are not doing enough, acceleration is key to create societal
unrest and collapse (Berger, 2021). Also concerning is the participation of law
enforcement and active duty members of the military, which seems to be a
problem both in the United States and Germany. The U.S. military has taken a
few steps to address the issue and Germany has been dealing with it for well
over a year.
January 6, 2021, like Charlottesville in 2017, has led to some disfunction
within far right groups. The alt-right took a hit after Charlottesville’s Unite the
Right Rally and the Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys appear to be negatively
affected as a result of the events at the Capitol. Members of both groups have
been arrested and it looks increasingly like some individuals may turn and
provide evidence against their cohorts. Two important lessons learned from the
recent uptick in far right scholarship, however, are the far right may lay low, but
they do not disappear, and they have mastered the use of the internet.
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